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THE INDIVIDUALISATION OF THE SOCIAL AND THE DE-SOCIALISATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

- Floyd H. Allport's Contribution to Social Psychology -

Mai 1984

Diskussionspapier Nr.

A. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

For the majority of professionally trained, i.e., academic psychologists as well as for most educated laymen interested in the field, psychology has become known as the scientific study of individual experience and behaviour or action. Whether explicitly stated, as in most definitions of the field, or merely presupposed, it is the experiencing and acting individual on whom psychological theories and research have focussed.

In the mother and model discipline of modern psychological science, viz., general experimental psychology (Allgemeine Psychologie), it is the generalised other individual whose states and processes we infer, about whom we make theoretical statements, based on data yielded by individual subjects. The same holds true for social psychology. Again, the object of research is the individual, restricted, however, to the extent in which the individual is affected (stimulated) by one or more other individuals. Since contemporary social psychology has become more and more interested in cognitive processes, the processing of information in one individual received from or about other individuals has come to be the favourite research topic. This implies that again the focus is on intra-individual events.

The terms "social" and "interpersonal", as frequently used in social psychology, actually mean intrapersonal processes as far as they refer to other individuals or to social aggregations. The reference as such is, however, not well accounted for in recent information-processing paradigms and models.

Consequently, as compared with social sciences like sociology or anthropology, which deal with trans- or supraindividual structures, social psychology is not a social science. Historically, this has not always been the case, nor does it presently hold for all kinds of social psychology. Acknowledging that Wilhelm Wundt was one of the influential founders of modern psychological science, we ought to remember that from his first psychological publications (Wundt 1862; 1863) down to his last book (Wundt 1920), he had maintained that psychology, in order to be a fully developed science,

must be both an experimental discipline (Physiological Psychology) and an historical discipline (Völkerpsychologie). Whatever today is considered a topic of social psychology would have to be allotted to the historical rather than the experimental discipline. With respect to the cognitive character of contemporary social psychology, one of the major reasons would be that cognition presupposes (supra-individual) language and culture into which each individual is "socialized" and, from childhood on, firmly embedded. According to Wundt no individual cognition, social or non-social (thought, judgment, evaluation), may methodologically be isolated from its socio-cultural basis, as is bound to happen in purely experimental analyses. That is why for Wundt the experimental approach, basic as it is, had to remain restricted to the most basic, i.e., simple phenomena of individual mental life. The investigation of the "higher mental processes" (which is the better part of what we call "cognition") as well as of the supraindividual mental products, i.e., the social objectivations of mind[1)], like language, art, morals, religion, and law, requires the (non-experimental) methods of "natural history" (Wundt 1913).

While Wundt insisted that the methods of "experiment" and of "history" were necessary complements for the development of psychology, his followers, disciplines as well as critics, "decided" to rely solely or, at least, primarily on experimental psychology. The socio-cultural topics of the Völkerpsychologie were left for anthropologists and sociologists to deal with. One of the historically important "choice points" for this development, as far as social psychology is concerned, is Floyd H. Allport's book of 1924 (Allport 1924).

To state that social psychology is not a social science in the usual sense of the word is correct only with respect to social psychology as a subdiscipline of psychology. The situation is different in those forms of sociological social psychology where the individual is primarily considered to represent or even embody social (or collective) structures (or systems), which have to be analyzed by methods other than experimental ones, e.g., by the interpretative (hermeneutic) methods.

In this sociological perspective, experiments with individual subjects are, if practised at all, of more or less important auxiliary character.

To consider Floyd Allport's "Social Psychology" of 1924 a kind of "choice point" in the development of psychological social psychology may be justified by reasons which the author himself explicitly stated. Briefly summarized they are:

(a) The psychological viewpoint is the individual viewpoint: "For I believe that only within the individual can we find the behavior mechanisms and the consciousness which are fundamental in the interactions between individuals" (p. vi).

(b) Scientific achievement in psychology has two causes. One is the adoption of the experimental method which makes psychology (as Wundt as well as Watson would have it) a branch of natural science. That is why Allport does not follow the many and varied "social psychologies" of the early twentieth century, but places himself in the footsteps of those few scientists who had approached social (alias interpersonal) relationships experimentally. Most of them were German educational psychologists or pedagogues who had studied the effects on scholastic achievement of the alone versus together situation. So we find Allport, encouraged and advised by Hugo Münsterberg, follow A. Meyer(1903) F. Schmidt (1904), E. Meumann (1914), W. Moede (1914; 1920), and, of course, N. Triplett (1897). Social facilitation and rivalry in coacting vs. face-to-face groups became thus the first (and lasting) topics of this new experimental social psychology, with individual performance or achievement as the preferred dependent variable[2)].

(c) The other cause, which Allport claims for the scientific progress of psychology, is the "behavior viewpoint". In Allport's understanding of this new perspective psychological science is regarded "as one fundamentally, though not exclusively, of behavior" (p. v). From now on, for a very long time, social psychology is in terms of stimuli and reactions, of which the former are afforded by the behaviour of other individuals, while the latter are adaptive responding movements fulfilling or satisfying some need. Consciousness may, but must not, accompany stimulations and reactions. Yet, since consciousness in itself is never a link in the causal chain between stimulus and response, it has no explanatory power (p. 2). Nevertheless, introspective

accounts may supplement interpretations on the descriptive side (p. 3).

Whereas Wundt separated his general (physiological) from his social psychology (Völkerpsychologie) so radically that, up to this day, both ends have never met again, Allport tightly bound social psychology to general experimental psychology, positing that social behavior "is based on the same fundamental needs as our reactions toward all objects, social or non-social" (p. 3f.). One difference, however, is stated, though hidden in a footnote rather than emphasized:

> "In the social sphere the environment not only stimulates the individual, but is stimulated by him. Other persons not only cause us to react; they also react in turn to stimulations produced by us. A circular character is thus present in social behavior which is wanting in the simpler non-social adjustments" (p. 4, n. 1).

Whether with respect to groups or, as we shall see, to crowds, social behaviour means: individuals reacting to individuals and being reacted to by other individuals.

> "There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals. Social psychology must not be placed in contradistinction to the psychology of the individual; it is a part of the psychology of the individual, whose behavior it studies in relation to that sector of his environment comprised by his fellows" (p. 4).

Everything worth knowing is to be found within the individual. To extend the principles of psychology to units larger than the individual "is to destroy their meaning" (ibid.).

In this strictly and essentially individualistic perspective of psychological science whatever is "social" must be accounted for in terms of intraindividual (intrapersonal, intraorganismic) states and processes, insofar as they have been affected by stimulation from other individuals. Since in the original (Watsonian) conception behavior, also for F.H. Allport, "may be defined as the process of responding to some form of energy in the environment by an activity generally useful to life" (p. 17), it is ultimately physical stimuli coming from other individuals which are supposed to afford the "socialization" of human behavior by means of a gradual modification

of the six important classes of human "prepotent reflexes": starting and withdrawing, rejecting, struggling, hunger reactions, sensitive zone reactions, and sex reactions (pp. 49 ff.). The mechanism by means of which these fundamentally biological activities are modified (= socialized) is, in all cases, conditioning. The telos, however, of all these learning processes and habit formations is not "the survival of the fittest", but "to substitute for the original biological end a somewhat modified purpose of social origin" (p. 82), or, equally vague, the social as well as the individual good (p. 53). In more strictly behaviouristic terms socialization toward "personality" is habit formation "in the service of life adjustments" (p. 99) - a basically biological perspective. Like other animal organisms human individuals are conditioned to adjust them(selves) to their environment. The principles of conditioning in themselves are not social, since stimuli are forms or variations of physical energy. It is exclusively the fact that a large and important part of environmental stimuli, viz., physical energy, is produced or otherwise provided by (other) individuals, and not by objects or things, which explains, but not justifies, the usage of the term "social" in this type of psychology.

The consequence of the behavioural approach in social psychology is twofold: The social has been totally reduced to the individual. Since, however, the stimulating agencies as well as the responding ones are individuals and, explicitly stated, nothing but individuals, the individualization of the social is identical with a de-socialization of the individual, if - and only if - "social" has no other (psychological) meaning than (intra- or inter-)individual. According to some influential writers around the turn of the century "social" does have a specific psychological meaning, irreducible to the individual mind and most conspicuous when we turn to groups and crowds. Historically and logically it was there that Floyd Allport had to bring his new conception to a critical test.

B. THE INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CROWDS AND GROUPS

Among those who held that mental life in the larger and more complex social aggregations is different in kind from the individual[3)], we should tentatively distinguish between scholars who emphasize the psychological reality of the society (or the nation or the people), within which we find groups and individuals, and those who concentrate on what happens mentally to an individual when entering or leaving any social grouping, small or large, group or crowd.

According to emphasis different theories arose with which Allport found himself confronted when he presented his individualistic approach. As it is the custom in scientific discourse and debate, Allport did not describe or reconstruct the dominant theories (he hardly quotes or mentions names). Instead he attacks them in criticizing three forms of the "group fallacy".

Before we take a closer look at Allport's critical typology we should make sure that the basic position with which Allport's individualism is at variance is clear.

We quote from one of the major opponents of an exclusively individual psychology, William McDougall, who was convinced that "... we must ... recognise the existence in a certain sense of over-individual or collective minds. We may fairly define mind as an organised system of mental or purposive forces, and, in the sense so defined, every highly organised human society may properly be said to possess a collective mind ... which yet is not comprised within the mind of any individual" (McDougall 1920, 9). Similarly, for behaviour McDougall states; "Under any given circumstances the actions of the society are, or may be, very different from the mere sum of the actions with which its several members would react to the situation in the absence of the system of relations which render them a society ..." (ibid.).

The principle which Allport wishes to criticize and keep out of psychology is contained in the postulate of "a kind of 'collective mind' or 'group consciousness' as separate from the minds of the individuals of whom the group is comprised" (Allport, ibid., 4).

Logically, it is hardly possible to identify the corresponding or equivalent points in both statements. Whether mind can be both individual and collective does, of course, depend upon the definition of mind. But McDougall's "definition" of mind is worthless since he "defines" mind by mental forces[4]. The statement that the actions of a society are different from the "mere sum" of actions which would obtain if individuals lived "in the absence of the system of relations which render them a society" (op.cit., 9), i.e., if they were "isolated individuals" (op.cit., 10), is open to several questions. What is and where does a psychologist find an "isolated individual"? Is the individual of general experimental psychology (including McDougall's psychologies of 1908 and 1912) an isolated one? Does any individual live in the absence of a system of relations of which McDougall (p. 9) says that it obtains between "individual minds"?

Equally Allport's understanding of the adversary viewpoint remains ambiguous. What does it mean that a group mind remains "separate" from the minds of those individuals who form the groups? Individuals, "of whom the group is composed", are they separate or even "isolated" individuals? For Allport certainly not. But a group mind which "overpowers" individual minds, is it a separate "entity" which existed before, say, an individual enters a group? Or is it something separate which only comes into existence when a group is formed or gets together? If Allport had quoted or otherwise identified the adversary positions with which he quarrels, the logical structure of the controversy would be much clearer.

Allport's own "classification" has been the splitting of all adversary theories of collective mind into three types of "group fallacy".

(a) The "Crowd Mind". The phenomenon to which we are referred by almost all partisans of the debate is briefly described by Allport: "It has long been observed that persons in an excited mob seem to lose control of themselves, and to be swept along by tempestuous emotions and impelling ideas" (p. 4). For Allport the heightened emotionality is a matter of fact, seemingly so self-evident that it even enters his own definition of the crowd. It is only the explanation in terms of a "lapse of personal

consciousness and a rise of a common or 'crowd' consciousness" (p. 4), which he criticizes by means of two arguments: First, consciousness depends upon a functioning nervous system. Crowds do not possess one. (We see that McDougall's functional "definition" of mind is disregarded.)
Secondly, he points to the absurdity of any explanation of crowd behaviour from the behaviour of individuals "in isolation". The crowd situation is a condition different from other conditions, but psychologically it remains a condition for individual behaviour and consciousness.
But, and here we find Allport's behaviouristic individualism at its strongest, "given the situation of the crowd - that is, of a number of persons within stimulating distance of one another - we shall find that the actions of all are nothing more than the sum of the actions of each taken separately" (p. 5).
Down to the linguistic form we have here the reflection of one of the great metatheoretical and methodological controversies of the early 20th century, closely connected with the rise of gestalt theory: Are wholes (or whole-qualities) different from the parts (and their part-qualities) of which they are composed? Are they more than, or different from, the sum of their parts? Gestalt theorists, who had been at work before the publication of Allport's book, remain unquoted. In any case, they would, for themselves, not have dared to expand the principle of the primacy of the whole (gestalt) into the social realm. Yet the ambiguous formula of the whole being more than the sum of its parts was making its bewildering way, being used as a dividing line between elementism and holism in many fields.
By his own phrasing we find Allport on the side of the elementists (as behaviourists would later on be characterized and criticized by gestalt theorists).

(b) The "Collective, or Class, Mind". One of the favourite topics of late 19th and early 20th century social psychologies was the relative uniformity or even "sameness of thought and actions" among the members of certain social bodies (as armies, parties, unions). Terms like "mentality", "esprit de corps" refer to some phenomena which, again, are not rejected as facts, but criticized as to a prevailing mode of explanation, which makes them separate psychological entities, not deducible from indi-

vidual states of mind or activities. Consequently, Allport stresses that such collective consciousness and behaviour "are simply the aggregation of theses states and reactions which, owing to similarities of constitution, training, and common stimulations, are possessed of a similar character" (p. 6). The collective, or class, mind is not an entity in itself, but a "convenient designation for certain universal types of reaction" (ibid.). Whatever we may say about the mind or, similarly, the activities of a social body or class, psychologically it refers to what the individual members of such bodies and classes think, feel, or do (p. 7).

(c) The "Group Mind". Here Allport refers to the notion "that a social mind exists, not in crowd consciousness nor mental collectivity, but in the sense of a permanent organization" (p. 8). The spirit of a nation, of a university, of the Catholic church, or of other traditional social and cultural institutions is considered to be an enduring mental form, outlasting the individuals and their minds who, for a time, share this supra-individual mental structure.

Again, for Allport such structures are in themselves not mental, but "they are sets of ideas, thoughts, and habits repeated in each individual mind and existing only in those minds ... They are learned by each individual from the specific language and behavior of other individuals" (p. 9).

In all these cases it is a fallacy to speak of a supra-individual minds which is mainly due to the linguistic convenience which makes it possible to make social aggregations the agents of any type of activity and the subjects of any state of affairs which "in reality" (says Allport) obtain only for individuals. Not the army captured the city, but the individual soldiers, not the crowd stormed the Bastille, but individuals "in a crowd situation" performed the historical act.

It is one of the most important tasks of social psychology to identify the conditions which induce, or maybe determine, specific types of collective behaviour, which must be read as individual behaviour under specific interpersonal conditions. Allport does this in two chapters on responses to social stimulation "in the more complex social situations" (p. 260), i.e., the group

and the crowd conditions. With a view to the general topic of the present volume I shall concentrate on Allport's analysis of the "crowd situation" (pp. 292-319).

While the lines between groups and crowds are not distinctly drawn and "one form is capable of passing into the other" (p. 260), the group is defined as any "aggregate consisting of two or more persons who are assembled to perform some task, to deliberate upon some proposal or topic of interest, or to share some affective experience of common appeal" (ibid.).
From this formation the crowd is distinguished "by the presence of emotional excitement and the replacing of the deliberate group activities by drives of the more primitive and prepotent level" (ibid.).
That is, already by definition, crowd phenomena are "described", fully in the tradition of the criticized crowd literature, by heightened affectively and simple or "primitive" drives. Allport does not consider the large variety of collective behaviours or mass phenomena; he does not try to differentiate between crowd situations as he did succesfully with groups. His favourite illustrations are "violent mobs", "riots", and the "imagined crowd" of the "public".
Since neither organized masses or unemotional crowds nor highly aroused groups are under discussion (they do not seem to fit into the schema), one gets the impression that "crowd" is being introduced as a term for a psychological state of affairs rather than to designate a specific form of social plurality. Quite consistent with his general conception of social psychology, Allport finds the explanation for crowd behaviour in states of the individual. Those who so far had written about crowds had "directed attention mainly to the crowd as a whole, and so have been descriptive rather than explanatory" (p. 292).
Besides emotion and drive a third "dynamic" category is required for a psychological understanding of crowd phenomena: suggestion. Leaning on his own theory of the process of suggestion (pp. 242-252), crowd is dynamically characterized as a "large-scale suggestion phenomenon. It exhibits all three phases of the suggestion process. The people are brought together by a common interest preparing them for a certain type of action. The harangue of the leader, or similar stimulus common to all, increases this pre-

paration to the point of breaking forth. The command or first movement of some individual toward the act prepared affords the stimulus for release. And finally, when act and emotion are under way, the sights and sounds of others' reactions facilitate and increase further the responses of each" (p. 292).

Allport is now able to formulate a theory of the "crowd man" (p. 304, 312) or of the "crowd situation" within a basically behaviouristic framework. But since his psychology was meant to be one of behaviour and consciousness he further introduces "attitudinal and imaginal factors" (pp. 305 ff.). As we shall see, it is these mental rather than behavioural factors which enable Allport to expand the range of (intended) validity of his theory.

The theory of the crowd man. Let us reemphasize that the following explanatory constructs and propositions are meant to refer to a relatively narrow range of mass phenomena, viz., the crowd situation, which is "a collection of individuals who are all attending and reacting to some common object, their reaction being of a simple prepotent sort and accompanied by strong emotional responses" (p. 292)[5].
The basic citeria of a crowd situation are then: (a) the prepotent primitive drives and correspondent reactions of the individual in a crowd situation; (b) the conditions which release and augment such prepotent reactions, while inhibiting restraining forces; and (c) mental processes occuring in the crowd man.

(a) The prepotent individual drives. Reference to fundamental individual drives and related activities, viz., to protection, hunger, and sex, is meant to account for the primitive or even barbarian "cave man", as which the popular and pseudo-scientific literature had depicted what Allport prefers to call the "crowd man". Yet even for Allport "the fact is clear that in crowd phenomena the fundamental drives of protection, hunger, and sex are the supreme controlling forces" (p. 293).
These drives which, according to Allport's general theory of motivation (chap. III), have been socialized "in the service of life adjustments" are, in the crowd situation, released

in their original strength. In the prototypical mob and riot situation, which Allport takes for "illustration", we should expect more than one of the prepotent reactions at work, mainly if the fundamental drives had been thwarted for a longer period of unemployment and poverty. Allport even ventures a generalization in form of a law-like proposition: "All of the fundamental, prepotent reactions are ... operative in crowds of various sorts, and conversely, all spontaneous mob-like crowds have their driving forces in these basic individual responses" (p. 294).

No wonder that the crowd situation is almost synonymous with struggle and violence (religious revival meetings being an exception to the rule). Struggle here always means struggle against "limitation, oppression, and opposition to the free satisfaction of original or derived drives" (ibid.). It goes without saying that, psychologically, it is of secondary importance whether the limitation and oppression are real and experienced or only imagined (see below). The important criterion is a strong, since thwarted (or potentially thwarted) fundamental drive. Mobs may destroy or kill or commit any other violent act; what the individuals in such crowds are "really", i.e., psychologically, after is "to restore their thwarted responses to their normal operation" (ibid.). What we have here is both a homeostatic explanation of certain types of collective violence and a precedent of what later became the frustration-aggression theorem[6], in any case, a strictly individualistic motivational account of collective behaviour.

"It is the individual therefore who is the raison d'être of the crowd. His response both provides the motive for the collective behaviour and limits its direction" (p. 296).

In spite of some basic differences about the nature and development of mental life in crowds between Allport and McDougall, the former stays in line with the latter as far as the motivational basis of collective experience is concerned. For it was McDougall who first conceived of a comprehensive theory of motivation as a propedeutic to social psychology (McDougall 1908).

Allport's central interest in the primitive drives as basic for the crowd man also brings him into a relatively close, but otherwise surprising association with psychoanalysis. Although suspicious of the psychoanalysts' "investment in a dogmatism which is repellent to many" (p. vi), Allport, again the behaviourist of an unorthodox kind, tries to assimilate some psychoanalytic notions which he deems useful for his own approach.

One year before Freud's "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse" (Group Psychology and Ego Analysis) was published (Freud 1921), we find an application of Freudian psychoanalysis to mental processes in the crowd in a book by E.D. Martin (1920), "The Behavior of Crowds". Allport was very much impressed by the novel view. Mainly it was two theses which Allport thought were easily assimilated to his own motivational conception:

(α) In crowd situations, the "primitive ego", supported by the crowd, achieves its end by overcoming social control mechanisms.

(ß) Due to the defense mechanism of repression the egoistic drives operate unconsciously.

Allport sees no fundamental difference from his own account. So he not only quotes Martin affirmatively and extensively (pp. 314-317, 378, 399-400), he also recommends that this book "should be read by every student of psychology or the social sciences" (p. 314, note 2). The individualistic interpretation of crowd behaviour finds its purest expression in the notion that the crowd situation is the proper setting for the "primitive ego".

(b) Release and augmentation of the prepotent individual reactions. The basic premise of Allport's account of crowd behaviour is that it is not different in kind but in degree from individual behaviour alone or in small groups. That it is greater in degree is due to the same mechanism which was introduced to explain the "social increment" in co-working groups: social facilitation, which is "an increase of response merely from the sight or sound of others making the same movements" (p. 262). Whereas, however, in the co-acting or working

group it is the speed and the quantity of work which are augmented, in the crowd situation it is the emotional reaction which is enhanced by the "sight and sound", mainly the expressive behaviour of others (p. 298).
Considering that the members of a crowd are "set", or have the attitude[7], for overt drive-related reactions (as of flight or attack), it is this readiness or attitude which is also released by the sight or sound of others.
Mainly in the physical density of mob-like crowds it can be the bodily pressure of the many who surge forward which effects the individual to behave in the same way and direction as the crowd does (ibid.). Allport concludes that in such situations "the individual assumes an attitude of the most complete submission and conformity" (ibid.), rendering him "still more susceptible to the effects of social facilitation" (p. 299).
In his analysis of the origin and the spread of social facilitation in crowds Allport discusses the role of speakers or others who gain control over the crowd, but also ecological (spatial) factors influencing the rise and spread of crowd reactions. The overall characteristic of the effect of social facilitation in crowds, or of the "circularity" by interstimulation, is an increasing degree of submission and conformity with respect to either the large number or the speaker who succesfully acts as the voice of the large number. That is why, upon final analysis, crowds are seen as conservative. Even revolutionary crowds, appearing as radical from the standpoint of the larger society or nation, are conservative in relation to the standards they maintain (p. 305). Such a conclusion should not be surprising, since crowds have from the beginning been psychologically defined as serving prepotent and simple drives. Consequently, "conservatism" is here a purely psychological term (p. 304).

(c) Mental factors in the crowd behaviour of the individual.
Facilitation through social stimulation alone cannot explain the occasionally extreme excitement of large crowds, which has been observed and/or reported[8]. The missing explanation is found in mental processes, more precisely, in mental imagery and in attitudinal settings of the individual crowd man. Since

in huge crowds the individual actually sees only a small fraction of the crowd, he tends to complete the picture with mental imagery. The individual thus creates for himself the "impression of universality" (p. 306), and he "reacts to stimuli which he actually receives as if they were coming from an enormously greater number of individuals" (p. 305). In addition, Allport postulates a kind of "social projection" to the effect that, when we ourselves accept the words of a speaker or leader, we act, convinced as we are, upon the assumption that others are feeling and doing the same (ibid.). This mechanism would, of course, add to the "impression of universality".
Whether this is so or not remains an open question since Allport, as usual, gives only a few "illustrations". The theoretically interesting point, however, is that by means of his theorem of the "impression of universality" he extends his crowd theory into the field of the public and of public opinion (p. 308). In contradistinction to what Park (1904)[9] had done, Allport assimilates the public to the crowd by defining the public (again psychologically) as an "imagined crowd" of which an individual believes that "certain opinions, feelings, and overt reactions are universal" (p. 308). The impression of universality is codetermined by the press, by rumour, and by "social projection", and, in due course, "exploited and commercialized both on the rostrum and in the daily press" (ibid.).
Although "interstimulation" seems to be a crucial explanatory construct in Allport's crowd theory, but will, as a rule, not be applicable to, say, the individual reader of the daily newspaper, Allport was not inconsistent when he broadened the range of applicability of his theory. All his defining constructs (the prepotent drives, the focussing on one object, the motor attitude, the heightening of emotions, and the impression of universality) refer to psychological, i.e., intra-individual mental states and processes. Consequently, even a physically isolated individual, as a solitary reader of the daily paper or a modern TV watcher, may, psychologically, be "one of the crowd" if the situation brings "prepotent drives" to the fore, evokes pertinent attitudes, by offering an object of which the individual assumes that a larger number of people pay attention to it, feel as strongly as he does about the common

object. Since there is no real interstimulation nor circularity the augmentation of the emotions and reactions should be much weaker than in a physically dense social situation, but, in principle, all the elements of a crowd situation are there, and should be there as long as there is one individual equipped with drives, attitudes, feelings and impressions. But, of course, another individual which permits of real interstimulation would be a convenient, though not necessary, element of an individualistically conceived crowd situation.

As we find it in the later development of (individualistic) social psychology: The "minimal social situation" is the individual.

Society: controlling vs. controlled individuals

Considering theories of crowd mind and behaviour in general we regard Allport's conception of the "crowd man" as an ideal case to substantiate the fundamental individualism of his social psychology. For, according to other authors discussed in this volume, it is in the violent mob situation that the individual is submerged, receding into the anonymity of the large number, acting in a "de-individualised" state of mind, etc. Not so in Allport's theory: The individual remains "the true psychological and organic entity" (p. 425) whether the social situation is solitary, minimal, or a huge crowd. Methodologically, the focus of research remains on the individual in order to find out what makes him a "crowd man"[10].

If it is individual processes and states of mind which account even for crowd phenomena, we should duly expect that every form of human social existence is individually explained. Without going into too much detail I would, in conclusion, like to draw attention to what Allport has to say about other mass phenomena of modern society. Although in his final chapter "Social Behavior in Relation to Society" the author enters "the domain of the social sciences, and particularly that of sociology" (p. 382), he does so as a psychologist, i.e., taking an individualistic viewpoint. We are not surprised than to find the nature of social structure and order discussed from this perspective.

While no single grand theory is able to account for all phenomena of social and societal life we still are reminded: "Given

the bare existence of human beings in one another's presence, they may be expected to develop an intricate and far-reaching system of social stimulation and response. This system furnishes the data for the entire science of social psychology" (p. 391).

Social order is conceived of as the "subordination of individuals to one another and to the regulated institutions of society" (ibid.). How social control is established in the individual is demonstrated by means of a very elementary socialization paradigm which depicts the gradual internalization of punishment by conditioning[11].

Suggestion and the impression of universality, important elements of the crowd theory, are repeatedly used to account for various other mass phenomena as, e.g., fashion, fads and crazes, the following of which "sometimes reaches an emotional intensity suggestive of crowd behavior" (p. 393); the same holds, as we already know, for rumour and public opinion.
Again in convention: that one is influenced toward confomity of conduct is largely due to the "impression that certain modes of action are universal" (p. 394).
As to institutional social control, as by government, law, education, and religion (pp. 398-407), Allport maintains that, like all other forms of control, it is established "by conditioning of mechanisms within the individual" (p. 398).

Also within the controlling institutions themselves we detect the mechanisms described in crowd psychology. In an historically interesting parallel to Le Bon's suspicion against democratic forms of government (Le Bon 1895), we read about the work of the law-making bodies (briefly after prohibition had become a law in the USA) that "such bodies, like all coverted into crowds. Facilitation of emotional response, impression of universality, and the conformity attitude, especially with regard to party opinion, operate in no small degree" (p. 401 f.). But Allport also knows of a solution: "Influence of this type could be reduced by entrusting greater power to small, well-chosen committees ... Another means of diminishing crowd factors in assemblies is the reduction of 'oratory' and other forms of persuasive appeal to a minimum" (p. 402).

Also in the economic sphere social control as well as exploitation are described in terms of individual drives and their utilization. Business and advertising yield excellent illustrations for the individualistic approach. It is the aim of the business man to increase his business, i.e., to induce people to buy his product. He is successful if he gains control over many others who usually have been coerced to buy by means of advertising, i.e., by appeals which are "conditioning stimuli for the arousal of prepotent responses in a manner conducive ... to the gain of a limited class of commercial men" (p. 408 f.)[11].

A final testing ground for his individualistic conceptions and a special field of application for his crowd theory Allport sees in industrial relations and industrial conflict. After many illustrations for the violent crowd (alias mobs and riots) had been taken from industrial strife, we now learn more about the conditions conducive to conflict and "struggle crowds". As happenings which release the required "emotional and withdrawing and struggling reactions" we find "bad working-conditions, underpay, fatigue, monotony, and continual fear of unemployment" (p. 411). While these may be considered to be objective working-conditions, Allport "discovers" other aversive conditions which may facilitate crowd behavior even when and where the conditions of laborers have improved:

"The rise of unions and the principle of collective bargaining have given laborers a power which they have never before felt. This actual power of unions is increased psychologically through the impression of universality (consciousness in each worker of the strength of his organization)" (ibid.). And, of course, "control through these crowd mechanisms has been widely exercised by agitators both in assembled crowds and through radical literature" (p. 412)[12].

There are other examples for Allport's highly consistent psychologisation, i.e., individualisation of social, political, and economic relations and processes. It is of interest to note that, when in these areas groups turn crowds and individuals become crowd men, we are referred to salient individuals who, as members of the crowd as well as over and against them, agitate the crowd, at least practice some form of suggestion in order to release and augment prepotent reactions to-

ward some goal. It is these leaders, very often psychologically conspicuous as orators or writers of radical pamphlets, who initiate and spread the impression of universality. Even if it is a mere "illusion of universality", it may help to precipitate the heightened affect and the readiness to act. Leadership in itself is regarded as a suggestion process to overcome all inhibitions blocking the acceptance of the suggested message (p. 421). Ascendance of the leader(s) and submission of the many followers are complementary individual states or traits[13] in any crowd process. The individual person, submissive in crowd situations and under other forms of social control, ascendant when or while controlling others by means of suggestion or argument, is the fundamental psychological unit, even in the analysis of society and of social change.

It is the individual with whom rests social heredity:

"Life is enriched not only through the scope of one's own adjustments, but through the influence of these adjustments reembodied in the lives of others. Progress which is the achievement of the individual becomes the heritage of the ages" (p. 430), is the proud conclusion of Allport's "Social Psychology" as well as a manifesto of liberal ideology.

C. THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN EVALUATION IN RETROSPECT

In the foregoing I have tried to show and to argue that at the beginning of modern social psychology there were two potential approaches to problems considered social: an "historical" and an "experimental" one.

Representatives of the first approach, as e.g. Wilhelm Wundt, held that cultural and culture-specific constraints like language, morals, religion, law, art determine human experience to such a degree that in order to understand individual experience (and today we would have to add: individual behaviour), we must have scientific knowledge of these cultural objectivations or mental products first. These products, however, "cannot be explained by the characteristics of the individual mind alone, since they presuppose the interaction of the many" (Wundt 1913, 3 [see note 1]). For the study of these products experimentation, the method appropriate only for the most elementary individual processes, has to be replaced by historical interpretative methods.
Since everything that may be called "social" is deeply imbued with linguistic, moral or other cultural factors the proper psychological (!) methods of investigation of social processes and states of affairs are those of "natural history" (Wundt 1913).
A social psychology, proceeding this way, would, on the one hand, have become a social science beside anthropology, sociology, history. On the other hand, Völkerpsychologie was a complement to a general experimental ("physiological") psychology.
Early representatives of the second approach to a social psychology, were experimental pedagogues who, at the beginning of the century, were heavily influenced by Wundt's new experimental (i.e., "physiological") psychology. Confronted with the problem of whether and which type of schoolwork is done better in class, i.e., together with others, or at home, i.e., alone, they discovered that only the experimental procedure would yield reliable results.
The first prominent and influential spokesman of this new experimental social psychology became F.H. Allport. Not the

"mental products" of larger cultural groups, but the behaviour and the behavioural achievement of individuals under different social conditions became his and his many followers' major scientific concern. "Social" from here on refers to individuals, as far as they "stimulate" another individual. Whether Allport or Allportian social psychology is interested in mental or behavioural processes, they are individual processes, called "social" only insofar as they stimulate, or are stimulated by, other individuals. In a rigorous fashion social psychology is thus fully integrated into a "psychology of the individual" (Allport op.cit., p. 4).

Even when Allport and subsequent social psychology deal with groups, crowds, institutions, or other manifestations of society, the strictly individualistic viewpoint has never been given up since, whether the theoretical emphasis was on motivational or cognitive processes. From F.H. Allport through his students Daniel Katz and Richard L. Schanck (Katz & Schanck 1938), to Jones & Gerard (1967) to the present, social psychology, as a subdiscipline of psychology, has remained "the scientific study of the behaviour of individuals as a function of social stimuli" (Jones & Gerard, op.cit., 1).

The more social psychology has become "cognitive" in the last few decades, the more firmly it has become a science which exclusively deals with intraindividual processes and structures, mainly of the information-processing type (Graumann & Sommer 1984).

Although the theoretical emphasis in sociology traditionally is on social structures and processes rather than on individuals, many sociologists from Simmel (1908) to Young (1946) set social psychology aside for the study of individual persons interacting. Which does not mean that for sociologists or other social scientists the individual or even the inter-individual may conceptually or methodologically replace the social.

In the end the issue between the two approaches to a social psychology as well as to a proper theory of crowds is between two conceptions of the social. How to define and how to explain social phenomena or, as Durkheim (1968) preferred to say, "social facts"?

Social Psychology between Emergentism and Reductionism.

That groups, crowds, and other collectives have mental qualities over and above those of their individual members was refuted by Allport as a "group fallacy". Everything mental is by (neurological) necessity exclusively individual. So whatever may be named group or crowd mind is not an entitiy in itself and must not be considered to be dependent of individual minds. It has to be accounted for in purely individual terms.

The more general question (as such not dealt with but unambiguously implied by Allport and his followers) is: What kind are phenomena or facts, called "social", which cannot be described and explained by reference to individual phenomena or facts? Are there any qualities at all which "emerge" when two or more individuals enter into interaction, qualities which are different from the qualities the individuals either have had before interacting or develop and maintain while interacting? All we know is that there are no mental qualities above the individual level. Without having to adopt May Brodbeck's empiricist position of methodological individualism, as contrasted with metaphysical holism, i.e., emergentism (Brodbeck 1968), it is useful to distinguish between her two meanings of methodological individualism. By "definitional methodological individualism" she understands the flat denial of any "descriptive emergence". The view is that there "are" no undefinable group concepts, that every group term will be "definitionally connected with a set of (relational) individual behaviors" (op.cit., 297).

Although only a group can, for instance, be cohesive, which individuals cannot be, the cohesion of the group is definable, and usually is operationalized, in terms of individual behaviours (mental choice, preferences, etc.). A closely related but different question is whether the "laws of the group sciences are in principle reducible to those about individuals" (ibid., 301). Those who are in favor of such reductions are committed to an "explanatory methodological individualism" (p. 3o2).

For the individualistic empiricist it is a logical consequence to be a definitional methodological individualist, but he need not be a reductionist, although most probably he will try to

be one. It is one thing to define the behaviour of crowds as the (individual) behaviour in crowds. It is another thing to have a comprehensive theory of individual behaviour that is capable of explaining crowd phenomena. That may be easy if behaviour in crowds is regarded as only quantitatively different from other behaviour (as Allport defines); it is much more difficult if qualitative differences, like milling behaviour of the moral atmospheres of institutions are under investigation. Groups, crowds, institutions may be definable in terms of individuals and of interindividual relations, plus the [usually ignored] physical facilities which make groups and institutions run. That part of our social reality is readily cut up and packed into the terms of social and physical "stimuli" by a flexible behaviourist, or into "cognitions" by an equally versatile cognitivist. But the "social fact" which Durkheim defined as "existing in its own right independent of its individual manifestations" (Durkheim 1968, 252), the "mental product" which made Wundt (1913) place psychology on a "second leg", can both be always "individualized" in the same manner as interindividual behaviour?

The question still is ambiguous. Most of us will agree with Durkheim when he states:

"The system of signs I use to express my thought, the system of currency I employ to pay my debts ..., the practices followed in my profession, etc., function independently of my own use of them. And these statements can be repeated for each member of society" (1968, p. 245).

But can these systems be said to function independently of any use of them? A meaningless question, for functioning here presupposes functional agents who turn out to be individuals. There are no social systems that can meaningfully be thought of as individual-free. It is individuals who carry and run them. "What if a war broke out and nobody went there?" - this ironical and rhetorical question of the present peace-movement reminds us of the "function" of individuals in social systems. But is it individuals who leave their homes and home-countries to fight a war over and around the Falkland/Malvinas? Is it individual citizens who by themselves and out of themselves, demand their governments to remain tough and unbending? Or are there "social facts" or "social forces" which make individuals behave and feel the way

they do? Or is there only "social stimulation" by individual politicians and media people?

It may seem idle to continue these two strains of questions which have been asked in social science for about 100 years. But have social and behavioural scientists realised that it is meaningless to separate "individual" and "society" as if they were two independent entities? Have they understood that individualising the social implies the de-socialisation of the individual? For, if psychological reality is restricted to individuals and their behaviour, if "social" has become another word for individuals interacting, then the only legitimation for individual behaviour to be called "social" is in the behaviour of other individuals if and as far as it 'influences' the former. The behaviour of others is, of course, as individual as any behaviour unless it becomes affected by others, etc. A circle arises which is vicious only for those social scientists, including psychologists, for whom social reality is more than individuals interacting, for whom the reality of supraindividual structure like cultural objectivations (such as language, art, mores, law, religion) or of social institutions (e.g., school, industry, church, army) is not wholly reduceable to individual behaviours or cognitions. Since reality psychologically always implies effects on experience and behaviour, severing the latter from its context amounts to a dubious narrowing of perspective.

Yet, although every human scientist knows that a de-socialised individual is as fictitious an entity as a de-invidualised society, psychologists, who try to explain social behaviour in terms of intraindividual (e.g., cognitive) processes and structures, find themselves in opposition to sociologists, who try to acoount for social systems and trends in terms of "group concepts" without systematic reference to individual experience and behaviour[14] or who, like Durkheim, define the social fact by "the power of external coercion which it exercises or is capable of exercising over individuals" (ibid., p. 250), thus

tearing the social and the individual apart.

The resulting dichotomy is usually defended as a case of division of labour. Division there is, but it is much more fundamental and, above all, in itself still unclear. At least, it is not yet proven that individualism in psychology or elsewhere

is merely methodological while its counter-position in the social and historical discipline is metaphysical. Questions have been raised about the ideological character of both holism and individualism as well as of the opposition between individual and society. The history of crowd theories, not only in its early stages, but also in its present, has alerted us to investigating the ideological function which theories, methodologies, and metatheories may adopt.

Notes

1) Wundt saw the necessity for Völkerpsychologie to become an integral part of psychology in the fact that we are always confronted with the task of accounting for the "mental products" (geistige Erzeugnisse) which originate in the social community and "which cannot be explained by the characteristics of the individual mind alone, since they presuppose the interaction of the many" ("Diese Aufgabe ist uns in allen den geistigen Erzeugnissen gegeben, die aus der Gemeinschaft des menschlichen Lebens hervorgehen, und die nicht aus den Eigenschaften des einzelnen Bewußtseins allein zu erklären sind, weil sie die Wechselwirkung vieler voraussetzen" (Wundt 1913, 3).
Wundt's own favourite paradigm for such cultural products (as we might freely translate) has always been language. A faint echo of the cultural and psychological primacy of language, maintained by Wundt can be traced even in the behavioral perspective of Allport. Language, or rather: vocal expression, is regarded as "the first and most important group of social stimuli" (p. 169). Moreover, it is still Wundt's theory of the origin of language in gesticulation that is considered fitting in a "social behavioral account of the origin of language" (pp. 193 ff.), where, surprisingly, we do not find any reference to G.H. Mead's adoption and elaboration of Wundt's theory of gestures (cf. Mead 1964).

2) That modern experimental social psychology originated in educational psychology or experimental pedagogy is not restricted to the German scene where, indeed, Wundt had strongly influenced pedagogues with his new experimental science, in which evolution and development had become primary principles of the mind. As Erika Apfelbaum (1979) has shown, a related development had begun in France under the influence of Binet - education being the field in which to analyze and discuss genuine social problems was "academically" permissible.

3) Since it is the purpose of the present volume to reconstruct various theories of collective mind and behaviour, conflic-

ting positions are here merely indicated.

4) Even the addition of "purposive forces" is not very helpful if we consider McDougall's rather individualistic theory of motivation (McDougall 1908).

5) In passing, it may be helpful to take a side-look at McDougall's "fundamental conditions of collective mental life":
"... the attention of all is directed to the same object; all experience in some degree the same emotion, and the state of mind of each person is in some degree affected by the mental processes of all those about him" (McDougall 1921, 22 f.).
Both McDougall and Allport then agree on (a) the common object of attention, (b) the emotional state of the crowd, including a predominance of the "coarser simpler emotions" (McDougall, p. 39) or the prepotent primitve reactions (Allport, passim), respectively; finally, (c) a reciprocity of affection within the crowd.
The points of disagreement are mainly on the explanatory level with the major controversy on the nature of the spread and heightening of affect: "sympathetic induction" (McDougall) vs. "interstimulation" (Allport).

6) According to the changing forms of the frustration-aggression theorem someone has to be "scapegoated" or "victimized", if the original frustration agent is either unknown, inaccessible, or too powerful. In a still vague but related sense Allport argues:
"Crowd struggle requires someone to struggle against. Its normal enemy is the hostile crowd or agency which is thwarting the desires or activities of the crowd members. In instances where the thwarting is due rather to circumstances than to human beings some enemy is found, and hatred developed against him in order to justify the crowd in getting what its members want by force" (p. 317).

7) "Attitude" is used here in the original psychological sense of Einstellung or "set", specifically as "motor set", i.e., a preparedness or readiness to react toward a class of stimuli (p. 244). The formation as well as the release of

such attitude is hypothesized to two of the major functions of suggestion. (Even in the modern construct of "social attitude" the motor-set aspect has been preserved as the "behavioral component" in so-called three-dimensional conceptions of attitude.

8) Allport himself does not seem to have made observations of large crowds. Occasionally, he refers to the mob-and-riot-type crowd phenomena as "well-known" or even as "too familiar to require special illustration" (p. 296). It is, of course, irritating to observe how the author of the theorem of "the impression of universality" (p. 305) never considers a self-application of his own theorem. On the other hand, the reader of Allport's book could be alerted by the footnote of page 308:
"Some speakers, in order to disarm the critical and avoid argument, prefix their statements by 'it is generally conceded that', or similar remarks".

9) Park's Heidelberg dissertation was published in German in 1904, but translated into English only in 1972. Practically unknown und unquoted (even by the author himself) for almost 70 years, we must conclude that Allport, too, had no knowledge of the book and its important distinction between the public and the crowd (cf. Park 1972).

10) Keeping close to Allport's discourse, I have followed his usage of speaking of a "crowd man" without mentioning the "crowd woman". As was costumary at the time in the English language the masculine gender was used as the comprehensive one. In dealing with crowds Allport does not explicitly refer to the female sex. We do find pertinent statements though, as "It is rightly said that women are more personal and emotional in their interests than men" (p. 345). But they are convincingly interpreted by references to the "pressure of a man-made double standard of morals" (ibid.), to a custom which is "largely the product of male jealousy" (p. 346), even to the female sex drive as "repressed by masculine regulations" (p. 347).

11) The broad range of possible individual drives and attitudes which is exploited by modern advertizing is given in form of a list:

"Protection from injury or impending desaster, sex, humor, hunger, pleasures of the palate, love of wife and children, the social self attitude, caste, social conformity, patriotism, and even love and respect for one's mother are all played upon to induce the purchase attitude and fill the coffers of the profiteer" (p. 408).

12) Allport even suspects that part of the force of labor unions is not directly due to the "economic drive", but to another equally psychological, i.e., individual motive: "Under the influence of the Russian revolution, a movement growing out of age-old class distinction and oppression of the proletariat, American laborers sought to relieve their minds of the unpleasant consciousness of inferiority. This they did by projecting upon the capitalistic class the charge of oppression and the intent to keep them (the workers) in a state of social and economic slavery" (p. 412). Again, economic relations and their social and political dynamics are kind of deduced from, at least interpreted in terms of, purely psychological processes, although the author concedes that the charge of "unfair distribution of wealth is partly justified" (ibid.).

13) Allport prefers to conceptualize ascendance of the leader as a trait "of paramount importance" (p. 422), whereas submission very often is characterized as an attitude to be built up in the (other) members of a crowd (ibid.). Since the later treatment of ascendance and submission as traits or states, by the Allport brothers and by others, must here remain undiscussed cf. pp. 119-121, and Allport & Allport (1921).

14) I ignore those behaviouristic sociologists who try to account for social structures in terms of (intra)individuals behaviour.

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