Perspectival Structure
and Dynamics in Dialogues

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Content

Abstract

The topic of dialogical perspectivity is introduced by a discussion of two complementary aspects of dialogue: the various conceptualizations of _what_ is going on in conversation and of _who_ is carrying on a dialogue. Perspectivity is then characterized as the common structure of cognitive experience. Its basic constituent is the intentional reference from a subject's viewpoint or position to an object, present in aspects that refer the subject to the inner and outer horizon of the object of cognition. This structure of reference not only establishes cognitive space, but also involves a dynamics of its own which, for the purposes of social interaction, presupposes perspective-taking. The triple reference in discourse, i.e., to topic, hearer and self, in establishing a (partly) common cognitive space is illustrated by the analysis of a dialogue on a controversial topic. Special attention is given to the mutually perspectival evolution of topics by comments.

1. Perspectives on the dialogue

The study of language may be approached from different viewpoints. The most notorious broad perspectives are "langue" and "parole". In addition, the latter, speech, or better, language use, permits of different perspectives. One of these perspectives, the dialogical perspective, is adapted in this book. Its prototype and the subject-matter of this chapter is the dialogue, the situation of talking together which, in turn, may be considered from different viewpoints. We may focus on the various forms that "discourse" may take, like conversation, discussion, debate, dispute, or gossip. We may be interested in the various topics of talking or in the social function of different types of dialogue. For the present purpose I shall only discuss two perspectives of a dialogue and briefly focus on the conceptualization (1) of <u>what</u> is going on in a dialogue and (2) of <u>who</u> is participating in a dialogue.

1.1 <u>Focus on what is going on in a dialogue</u>

Whatever the different definitions of dialogue may be, there seems to be widespread agreement that "dialogue" refers to the togetherness of talking, to the mutuality of exchanging ideas, i.e., to an activity shared by two or more partners. The basic character of this activity seems to have been preserved from the Greek origin of the word, the <u>dialegesthai</u>. The word is usually translated as "conversing" or "discussing", but it is important that its original meaning, that of speaking (and thinking) together about something in such a way that is it something <u>between</u> the speakers, should be retained. It is this metaphor of <u>moving</u> from two or more positions toward the same place (even if there be agreement to disagree as to what place it should be) that needs further clarification if we want to understand what is meant by "conversing" or by "exchanging ideas".

In discourse analysis the question of what is going on in dialogues is frequently answered by reference to "utterances". The term itself implies that inner contents or events, such as ideas or feelings are expressed by vocal sounds - a useful implication for a psychologist who is interested in the interrelation and interaction between linguistic and mental activities. But in pragmalinguistics the prevailing focus is on utterances as _units_ and, consequently, on the rules according to which such units are produced and ordered. Explicitly by analogy with phonemes and morphemes, Pike (1967) introduced the "uttereme" as a special case of "behavioreme". Yet, although such structuralist notions of units of discourse seem to be out of date, the focus on units and rules is not (cf. Edmonsen, 1981; Taylor and Cameron, 1987). As a basically behavioural unit "utterance" refers to a stretch of speech rather than to the act of uttering (cf. however Bakhtin, 1986).

The necessity for discourse analysis is obvious (cf. Coulthard, 1977; Henne and Rehbock, 1982). However, there is also the danger of neglecting the movement or process character of acts of utterance. Whoever is interested in the dynamics of dialogue may be forced to use the tools of discourse analysis, but must also try to catch the movement character of talking together.

The interest in the motion occurring in dialogues seems to be lacking altogether in modern models of language processing. Theories of information-processing in language production and comprehension merely account for what is happening between input and output rather than what goes on between output and input. Such models are basically monological in kind (cf. Herrmann, 1985; Levelt, 1989).

1.2 Focus on who is carrying on a dialogue

The question of who is usually taken to be involved in a
dialogue is easily answered if we look at the literature on
discourse analysis. We are mainly referred to "speakers".
Speakers may be categorized according to the three
following emphasis: (1) The person who speaks to the
other(s), (2) the person who expects to be and is spoken
to, and (3) the person who is spoken about (Jacques, 1979).
Sometimes the person spoken to is categorized as the "hear-
er" or (1) and (2) are additively combined into a
"speaker/hearer". This is not the place to criticize the
reduction of human beings to speakers and hearers ones;
similar reductions are common in the social and behavioural
sciences. When the focus of scientific interest is on
particular functions we speak of perceivers, of problem-
solvers, even of deciders and, most recently, of informa-
tion-processors. But we should remain conscious of the re-
ductive character of such abstractions which, all of them,
originate in a specific theoretical perspective. The
question is which perspective is the most adequate and pro-
ductive for a given problem.

If we are interested in the dynamics of dialogue, then we
may ask ourselves whether speaking or uttering, and hearing
utterances, is an adequate description of the activity of
human beings in dialogues. It is not enough if, as is often
the case, speaker/hearers are taken to be basically inde-
pendent communication units (Osgood and Sebeok, 1965), tak-
ing turns in "emitting" or speaking and "receiving" or
hearing messages or utterances. The modern version is the
information-processing system unit, the most advanced ver-
sion of which uses an internal partner model; i.e. the
partner is interiorized as a subsystem within an integrated
speaker-hearer system (Herrmann, 1985). The other person
with whom one is in dialogue is aptly named a "partner",
but remains theoretically restricted to a cognitive
representation in the integrated hearer/speaker system (pp.
12-14). The original meaning of the word "partners" as per-

sons sharing something or engaging in a common activity has here been reduced to the representation of two separate units, a consequence of psychological individualism.

A different way of conceptualizing partners in dialogue is in terms of roles. This basically dramaturgical notion, favoured by sociologists and (some) social psychologists, presupposes both a context (a social system) and an interrelationship between different roles. Both features also apply to the dialogue; hence, the quite common usage of the "role of the speaker (or hearer)" (cf. Graumann and Herrmann, 1989). Since, however, the concept of a role also presupposes a position in a social system that can be filled by different individuals, it is difficult to see what a position (in the sociological sense of the word) could be in a dialogue. Speakers and hearers are certainly not positions to be filled, if we disregard "Speaker of the House" and related social positions.

Another argument against using the "role" concept for the interlocutors in a dialogue derives from the general social-psychological conception that roles carry expectations which others hold about the role occupant's appropriate behaviour, and therefore the behaviour appropriate to the position presupposed by that role. There are, without doubt, expectations also in dialogues that a partner should fulfil according to common postulates or maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975). But such appropriateness is conversationally universal rather than position-specific.

While "partner" seems to be the least restrictive term for those who engage in a dialogue, it is not specific enough to denote their joint activities and contributions. We need qualifying terms which help us to grasp the characteristic dynamics of dialogues. A very adequate term we may take from Bakhtin's literary analyses: voice (Bakhtin, 1973; cf. Wertsch, 1987). Voice is both consciousness expressed and reaching others - a relational term. A dialogue is a combination of voices, it is polyphonous. The voices in dialogue

are persons speaking "in concert", but a person engaged in a dialogue is not restricted to one voice. He or she may speak with different voices, thus increasing the polyphonous character of dialogues. This differentiation of the dialogue by different but orchestrated voices contributes to its character of _unitas multiplex_. What the metaphor of the voice does not make intelligible is the movement that is implied in the traditional conception of the dialogue as an "exchange of ideas". The question of what is meant by the latter figure of speech will be taken up after the conception of perspectivity has been introduced, which we present for a further clarification of the structure and dynamics of the dialogue.

2. The perspectivity of experience

2.1 The structure of perspectivity

There is a set of perspectival terms in use in everyday language as well as in several scientific disciplines. Perspective, point of view, aspect, horizon are the most common ones. They all refer to different features of a structure of representation which goes back to the Renaissance technique of representing (picturing) objects and scenes so that they appear as if seen from a particular viewpoint or standpoint (Graumann, 1960; 1989). Making use of the later phenomenological explication of perspectivity, we may generalize: From a subject's particular point of view objects are seen in those aspects that correspond to the given viewpoint. But in their "aspectivity" they refer the perceiving subject to further aspects of the same as well as to its immediate surroundings. The house that I view or approach from a given point in space (viewpoint) is present to me in one of its aspects (sides, corners, views) that refer me to other sides of this house. Wherever I stand, although I see the house _in_ one of its aspects, I never see aspects. From whatever position I behold the house I see it in its context, the garden, the street leading to or away

from it, the row of houses of which it is one. Since aspects are, by definition, appearances for a subject, the latter is always a constitutive ingredient of perspectival representation without being explicitly "represented".

It was mainly Husserl (1973) and other phenomenologists and phenomenological psychologists who extended the conception of a perspectival (or horizonal) structure of perceptual experience to all cognitive experience. Also due to them is the idea that an object of thought, such as a problem, is approached from a certain position with respect to which it appears. In other words it is constituted in one of its aspects, in specific relations to other objects to which the thinking subject is referred within a horizon of comprehension and of anticipation.

Take, for example, Wilhelm Wundt, one of the so-called founders of modern psychology, who keeps appearing in the most different aspects or "faces": as the promoter of a general experimental psychology, which made psychology an individual independent discipline; or as the most prominent protagonist of a historical and comparative Völker-psychologie, the psychological study of language, mores, myths, and law, where experimentation has no place; or as the philosopher who never wanted psychology to become separated from philosophy, etc. While it is true that each of these "Wundts" refers to the identical historical person, each carries its own inner and outer horizon, its own "thematic field" of relevances (Gurwitsch, 1964).

2.2   The dynamics of perspectivity

It is hardly possible to characterize the perspectival structure of experience without referring to its dynamics. Being related intentionally to an object in one of its aspects implies being related referentially to further aspects of that object by a process of mental locomotion in a cognitive field. The term "locomotion" is used here ac-

cording to Lewin (1936) as any change of position within a
field, be it physical, social, or conceptual. An aspect is
not a sharply bounded part of something, nor is the horizon
a fixed limit, but the line of transition from the perceiv-
ed to the perceivable, from the known to the knowable, from
the actual to the possible, from the given to the new. With
each movement of the perceiving or knowing subject the cor-
responding object changes; the horizon always moves with a
subject's locomotion. This incessant locomotion from the
actual to the potential is the intrinsic dynamics of per-
spectivity. Potentially, we are always en route toward the
horizon (van Peursen, 1954), factually, however, we may
"get stuck" within a habitual perspective from which we see
"nothing but" what we used to see (Graumann, 1960). Condi-
tions conducive to cognitive locomotion are topics of re-
search into creativity and problem solving. The creative
solution of a problem is very often equivalent to reaching
a new perspective.

2.3 The reciprocity of perspectives

To take a perspective that is different from the one ha-
bitually or presently held is a cognitive skill which is
acquired during childhood. According to G.H. Mead (1934),
this skill is learned in the context and course of games.
Already when little children play at being parents, teach-
ers, or doctors, they "take roles", i.e. perspectives, as
far as they understand them. But in rule-governed games
only the participating child "must have the attitude of all
the others involved in that game". (Mead, 1934, 154). Tak-
ing the other players' perspectives affects an individual's
own acts which, by virtue of this role-taking, are
constituted as social acts. To take the attitude of a whole
group is a further step towards taking the perspective of
>the generalized other< (ibid.).

In the early twenties, it was the German philosopher and
pedagogue Theodor Litt (1924) who, unaware of Mead's (then

unpublished) conception of perspective-taking, developed the idea that within each "perspective of ego" I am bound to discover "objects" whose peculiarity it is "to have a perspective of their own" and, hence, will have me contained in their perspective (Litt, 1924, 33). To know me as contained in another's perspective is to realize that I can and will be seen with different eyes. That is how I can learn to see myself "differently" (p. 38). In sum, for Litt as much as for Mead, it is the basic <u>reciprocity of perspectives</u>, i.e., the mutuality of perspective-taking, that constitutes the conception of the Ego (Litt) or Self (Mead).

A different concept of reciprocal perspectives is presented by Schütz (1962). His general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives refers to two pragmatic idealizations: (a) of the "interchangeability of standpoints", (b) of the "congruence of relevance systems". The former is the assumption that if I were where you are now I would experience things in the same perspective as you do now and vice versa. The latter is the belief that in spite of all differences between you and me, due to our different biographies, we can still act together and pursue common goals as if our differences were irrelevant (cf. Schütz and Luckmann, 1974, 60). Ultimately, "the life-world accepted by me as given is also accepted by my fellow-men as given" (op. cit., 68). (The "general thesis of the <u>alter ego</u>" was first presented in Schütz, 1932, 106.)

What we may learn from these three conceptions of perspectival reciprocity is that perspectives, as inevitable as they may be for human experience, can be transcended, shared or even traded. But we learn little about how this is accomplished.

Only a few social psychologists have taken up the idea of the reciprocity of perspectives (e.g., Ichheiser, 1943; Laing et al., 1966); others have dealt at least with the role of perspective in social judgement (Ostrom, 1966;

Ostrom & Upshaw, 1968; Upshaw and Ostrom, 1984; for an
overview see Graumann, 1989). But so far the interplay of
giving and taking perspective in social interaction has
been ignored as a topic of research.

In the following, the focus is on how perspective is pre-
sented and accepted, given and taken in linguistic communi-
cation.

3. Perspectivity in dialogues

3.1 The triple intention of discourse

Uttering something in a dialogue is intentional in three
different ways. Leaning on Karl Bühler (1982), who in turn
goes back to Plato's conception of language as an _organum_,
i.e. as tool or instrument, we can define speaking as a
person's communication with another about something. Pheno-
menologically, we may here recognize a triple intentional-
ity. In speaking a person (1) expresses or reveals what he
or she is like or has "in mind", be it ideas, feelings, or
intentions.[1] Simultaneously, the speaking person (2) ad-
dresses another person, thereby trying to draw the other's
attention to what he or she is speaking is about. (3) Re-
ferring the other to certain objects or states of affairs
by means of speaking is the third relation in the
intentionality of an act of speaking. Going beyond Bühler,
whose semiotic organum model is sign-centred, we recognize
the triple intentionality of the speech act: the person's
(not necessarily conscious) intention to utter his or her
thoughts and states of mind; the person's intention to com-
municate with another person; and the person's intention to
refer to specific things or events.

It is in this paraphrase of Bühler's model that the
perspectivity in dialogues becomes evident. A person
referring to an object or state of affairs does so from a
particular point of view, in a special sense or relation.

When in semantics or in the theory of grammar a distinction is made between the topic of a sentence and its comment (Lyons, 1968; 1977), the topic is that <u>about which</u> something is said and the comment <u>that which</u> is said about some person or thing. As terms signifying the basic constituents of sentence structure they may suggest that, if we can analytically distinguish between object and viewpoint, the object referred to becomes the topic while the perspective in which a speaker views the object is presented as the comment.

This is indeed often the case. Referring to one individual house I may say

(1) This house is ugly
(2) This house is for sale
(3) This house is the oldest one in the street, etc.,

thus placing my referent in an (1) aesthetic, (2) economic or (3) historical perspective by means of the different comments. But I may also induce such perspectives by means of different topicalizations:

(4) The ugliness of this house is an eyesore
(5) The sale of this house has been advertised
(6) The oldest house in the street is here.

It is true that in the comments of (4) to (6) some further information is added to the topic, but the perspective in which I want my partner to see the "given" house may be induced by either topic or comment.

For the triple intentionality of discourse, which we adapted from Bühler's <u>organum</u> model, this means: Besides expressing myself and appealing to my partner's attention I refer the latter not only to an object or state of affairs but I also try to make my partner see (understand, conceive, judge, etc.) it the way I do, i.e., from my point of view. "Reference", therefore, is more than the "representational"

function of signs with respect to nonlinguistic entities. It is also, at least in dialogical utterances, the communication of the position from which this entity is seen by a speaker. Only by offering such "positions-from-which" is the possibility opened for speakers and listeners, for the different voices in a dialogue, to jointly attend a topic from a common "origo of intersubjectivity" (Rommetveit, 1974, 41; cf. 1980).

This joint attention is fully achieved when the triple intentionality of discourse is confirmed by an interlocutor's partner. This triple intentionality consists of the expression of what a speaker has in mind, of the appeal to a listener's attention as well as of the dual reference[2] to both an object and its mode of apprehension from a given position. That referring in dialogues is a collaborative process has convincingly been demonstrated by Clark and his associates (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Clark and Schaefer, 1989). The common origo is also the point of departure from which interlocutors may jointly move in the cognitive space shared by them (Graumann, 1989) and "exchange ideas".

3.2 The mutual perspectival evolution of topics in dialogues

We have now reached a point where it should have become evident that perspectivity in language is an intrinsically interactional phenomenon. Whether, beyond the visual sphere, there is something like a purely cognitive, i.e. pre-linguistic, perspective, with its correlative terms of viewpoint and aspects (horizon) of an object, is difficult to decide since almost all we know about our mental structures and processes we have learnt through the medium of language. Whatever I present as my view on a given matter, I offer as a potential perspective for others. Even if the other does not adopt my perspective on a topic, in order to reject it the other speaker must have recognized it as a potential view, i.e., a communicable perspective. Inverse-

ly, an interlocutor, in the strict sense of the word, must have the capacity to adopt the perspectives that are proposed by the other participants in a dialogue (Rommetveit, 1974, 44). This capacity complements the word knowledge and world knowledge basic to any meaningful language use. Since, however, knowledge is always in relation to a position (Mannheim, 1936) and "every constitution of meaning refers back to an individual perspective" (Apel, 1973, 98) the capacity to take other persons' perspectives may be considered the elementary communicative competence.

How does this basic mutuality of perspective-taking or rather the give-and-take of perspectives, of a topic show in a real dialogue? How can the structure and the dynamics of a dialogue be accounted for in terms of the reciprocity of perspectives? There seems to be more theoretical agreement than empirical evidence on this matter.

Resuming our initial question of what is going on in a dialogue and who is engaging in it, we can now focus on the special issue of what happens to a topic once it has been introduced, i.e. proposed by a speaker and accepted by the other interlocutors. As long as the topic is preserved, i.e. talked about, we may expect something like the "communicative dynamism" of the Prague School of Linguistics (Danes, 1974; Eroms, 1986), a concept according to which utterances are parts of a process of unfolding meaning, but differentially contribute to this evolution.

3.3 An empirical illustration

As an exemple of an unfolding process of accepting, refusing, and substituting aspects of a general topic and its subtopics we take the case of a small-group discussion with five French and German interlocutors speaking German. The topic ("Differences in Environmental Awareness and Activities in France and Germany") was introduced and accepted by the group. It was meant to be controversial since, for

some time, the issue of environmental concern had been discussed differentially and, often enough, polemically in French and German media. While in general, many German journalists and politicians had been critical of both the French lack of concern for air and water pollution and the seemingly unrestricted growth of nuclear industry in France, their French counterparts prided themselves over their expanding clean (nuclear) industry in their own country, and ridiculed the mentality of their eastern neighbours who so emphatically bevailed "le Waldsterben" in Germany while racing their powerful cars on the Autobahn at unlimited speed.

So much briefly about the social context of the dialogue. The dialogue was taped and transcribed; the micro-analysis of linguistic variables as indicators of perspectives is still going on.[3] But from a first macroanalysis it is possible to portray some of the dynamism due to the unfolding of aspects.[4]

Within the first 20 minutes of an altogether 90 minute dialogue on the general topic of differences in environmental awareness between France and Germany three aspects or facets of this topic were brought up and discussed in terms of seven explanations for the differences. If we list the explanations separately as subsequent to the various subtopics, the thematic sequence of the dialogue is summarized in Table 1.

In order to show how the general topic is jointly 'processed' either by introducing new facets or by offering explanations a summary of the sequence of arguments is given in Table 2. The summary reveals how some explanations are accepted, i.e. confirmed, some are rejected, e.g. as irrelevant, some are questioned, some are conditionally accepted in typical yes-but responses. But whether accepted, rejected, questioned, or qualified the sequence of arguments reveals that the topic is coherently adhered to. Even a temporary rejection of an argument as "not relevant" does

not break the coherence of the dialogue. As may be gleaned from the transcript, the refusal of one argument is also the challenge to bring a more "relevant" one; moreover, the rejected explanation recurs at a later stage of the dialogue.

Whether the group talks about environmental awareness in general, about air and water pollution or about nuclear energy, what they do together is the dialegesthai, i.e. the explicating or unfolding dialogical "dis-coursing" and "dis-cussing" of a shared topic. Sharing, however, does not mean harmony; it may mean tension. Very often the common topic is approached from different, even conflicting viewpoints. Or, an argument is superficially accepted, but not in the intended meaning.

When a French discussant tries to account for the differences in ecological awareness by reference to the different histories, her argument is that the discontinuity of German history in 1945 was a chance to critically reconsider old ideas and develop new ones, a German partner, while agreeing that the Germans do have the problem of coping with their recent (Nazi) history, dismisses the historical argument as irrelevant for the topic under discussion.

But a few minutes later, when the role of the political parties is discussed, it is the same German interlocutor who wonders why in France "1968" has not resulted in an ecological movement as it happened to develop in Germany.

The act of making an aspect a subject of discourse is an act of selection and an effort to structure (control) the next phase of the dialogue in accordance with one's values. The perspective in which a speaker presents a topic and which the hearer is invited to take is rarely evaluatively neutral. In most cases, the aspects that we select are positive or negative evaluations of the object of reference.

For Nietzsche, the profoundest philosopher of the per-
spectivity of life, perspectives are intrinsically evaluat-
ive. To posit values is the setting of perspectives and of
horizons (Nietzsche, 1980, 20; cf. Graumann, 1960, 38-44).
In a dialogue, the perspective I present is for me (and for
the time being) a preferred perspective. So will be yours,
from your point of view. What we call the <u>divergence of
perspectives</u> (Graumann, 1989; Mummendey et al., 1984; Mum-
mendey & Otten, 1989) is basically a difference of valua-
tion. That is why utterances reveal a speaker's perspective
not only by the more or less explicit reference to a stand-
point, but also by direct or indirect evaluations.

Discussing, for example, the <u>Waldsterben</u>, a French interlo-
cutor may explicitly state that from her point of view it
is incomprehensible that the Germans, who keep lamenting
the dying of their forests, are unwilling to introduce a
speed limit for the <u>Autobahn</u>. But within the context of air
pollution and acid rain the mere reference to unlimited
speed is in itself a critical utterance. The same applies
in our sample to a German speaker's reference to the French
lack of concern over their increasing production of nuclear
energy when the topic discussed is environmental awareness.

Sometimes the means of perspectival evaluation are too sub-
tle for discovery by macroanalysis. Thus, distancing from
and identifying with a position are dynamically essential
modes of structuring a cognitive space with respect to dif-
ferent positions.

A German speaker, for instance, may be "totally unable to
understand" that the French do not get excited over the
pollution of the rivers Rhine and Loire. He explicitly di-
stances himself from the "incomprehensible" French
indifference. On the other hand, a French interlocutor, un-
der the impression that in Germany everything is so dense
and narrow, expresses her understanding for the Germans'
dependence on cars: They need to get out to the woods for
fresh air. But why at unlimited speed?

Sometimes the distancing or identifying attitude is recognizable in the (perhaps involuntary) choice of pronouns or of personal vs. impersonal forms of immediacy vs. non-immediacy (Wiener & Mehrabian, 1968; Graumann & Wintermantel, 1989). The examples from our dialogue may demonstrate this usage in speakers' references to their own group.

A German speaker criticizes that after Chernobyl "the Germans were so stupid that they went to the Alsace in order to buy non-contaminated cabbage ...".

Here evidently the speaker distances himself from "the Germans" just as a French speaker does in the following sentence about the French, referring to them as "people":

"People don't care about the environment, maybe people care about their own gardens ...".

Contrariwise, the same French speaker identifies with the French when, discussing garbage disposal, she states:

"People (in Germany) very often keep three (separate) kinds of garbage in their kitchen ... We don't have it that way and maybe we couldn't do in France. We would find it too strenuous."

These few examples may illustrate that the dynamics of a dialogue are to be found not only in the different perspectives stemming from the fact that different interlocutors interact, but also from the possibility that one and the same speaker contributes different voices to the dialogue: positive and negative ones, pros and cons, voices to keep one's distance from and voices to identify with. The polyphony of a dialogue originates in both the variance of voices between and within interlocutors.

Speaking in a different voice is not restricted to the rare cases of conversion. It is the ordinary case of dialegein.

Depending on whom I am talking to I will anticipate differing viewpoints or objections from my partner's side and, hence, try to incorporate them in my own speech. Sometimes I will explicitly contrast differing viewpoints: <u>On the one hand</u> ... <u>on the other hand</u>, <u>in one respect</u> ..., <u>for one thing</u> ... <u>for another thing</u>, <u>from my point of view</u> ... <u>from yours</u> etc. Or I will raise self-objections, self-criticisms, introduce hedges and reservations. Often enough my mental reservations become manifest only in qualifying conjunctions and adverbs like <u>but</u>, <u>though</u>, <u>yet</u>, and <u>however</u>.

Altogether the whole repertoire of rhetorics is available to express the multiperspectivity of cognition. As Michael Billig (1987, 49) summarizes, it has always been the rhetorical approach that "stresses the two-sidedness of human thinking and of our conceptual capacities", i.e., the dialogical character of human cognition.That is why the proper place to study cognition is the dialogue rather than monological information-processing. We concur with Markus and Zajonc (1985, 212 f.) who, discussing the communicative aspect of social cognition, criticize "a unilateral input/output paradigm that stops short of reciprocity" and dare to predict:

"It is likely that in the near future the major new method of studying social cognition and of cognition in general will be the dialogue ... individual subjects in interaction ... may disclose a great deal of context and structure of their own cognitions and help reveal the cognitions of others." (ibid.)

But for social psychologists, who will not shy away from the study of interaction, the postulate to study cognition in dialogues implies the readiness to finally include the everyday use of language in their field of study and, with the help of language psychologists, to develop and refine such methods as are capable of capturing the reciprocity and multiperspectivity of dialogical interaction.

Table 1. The dynamics of a dialogue: Perspectival structure
in terms of subtopics and explanations of differ-
ences (Extract)

(Aus Graumann, C.F.: Perspectival Structure and dynamics in
dialogues)

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1. Topic of the dialogue (between French and German participants):

   The differences in environmental awareness between France and Germany

2. Aspects of the topic, as brought up during the dialogues (chronologic-
   (chronological order)

   (1)* Differences in environmental awareness

   (6)   Differences in environmental activities

   (7)   Nuclear plants and the No-nuke movement

3. Explanations offered for differences in environmental awareness
   (chronological order)

   (2)   Different histories

   (3)   Differences in polulation, urban and industrial density and
         impact

   (4)   Different attitudes with respect to present and future

   (5)   Different dispositions to act collectively or individually

   (8)   Different "1968" traditions: The "Greens"

   (9)   Centralism in France

   (1o) Different attitudes with respect to capitalism: The ecological
         movement (cf. 8)

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*The figures refer to the order of presentation in the full length transcript.

Table 2. The dynamics of a dialogue: The perspectival development
of the topic (Extract)

Legend: G = German(s), Germany; F = French, France; E = environment(al)
→ = responses; acc = acceptance; rej = rejection; y/b = yes-
but response; ? = questioning; (1) ≐ Figures refer to the order
of presentation (first mention)

G	F
(1) E(nvironmental) awareness, still weak in G, in F even weaker	`acc` ——→ People in F are not concerned by the Rhine, Loire, Chernobyl catastrophes
(2) This is a different topic	The difference may have to do with `rej` Germany's past: ←—— The reconstruction after World War II.
(3) But there are high density areas in F. There should be more concern in F. More actions.	More urban and industrial density in G. Everything is so narrow. People need woods and fresh air. In F there is more wilderness. You can get there by bike. In G you need the car. `y/b` In F it is not so necessary ←—— to protect nature.
(2) I doubt it. Look how little the G have learnt from their past. Take rearmament.	`y/b` ——→ Yes, but the past is also important. F has an old tradition. Things change gradually. There was no break with `rej` our past. In G there was something ←—— new.
(3) But, irrespective of history, there is the immediate impact, as the salination of the Rhine (by the F). But the F are not worried. Why?.	
(4) Perhaps it has to do with a different attitude toward the future; the F tend to enjoy the present and do not care about the future Is this not a stereotype?	`acc` ——→ There may be a great difference. We F enjoy life, in G life is more "in- `?` tellectualized" ←——
(5)	The F do not fight so much collective- ly, in demonstrations as the G who take to the street. The F do more in- dividually
(6) I must contradict: In G by far too little is being done	`rej` In F, we do not do much; ←—— in G, they do too much No more Greens in F, but in G. there are many. In G people sort out three different kinds of garbage. In F we would find this too arduous.
(7) In F you have so many nuclear plants The F do not do anything about them inspite of the great danger. Every- body knows about the sick rate and the grass getting brown. This ought to concern the F.	`?` ——→ Never heard about such things in the `rej` newspapers ←——
(8) This is not a matter of information. In F no ecological movement develop- ed from the 68 movement; why? In G most "sixty-eighters" ended up in the ecological movement. The dif- ference is incomprehensible.	
(9) Perhaps F has been centralized for too long. Centralism fosters passivity.	`acc` ——→ Possibly, people expect more from Paris than from themselves
(1o) In G, an attitude opposed to capitalism. Perhaps in F people do not feel restricted	`acc` ——→ People in F feel far away from the State and from Paris. Everybody for himself!

(Aus : Perspectival structure and dynamics in dialogues)

Notes

[1] For Bühler (1982) the expressive function of signs does not refer to everything a "sender" may have "in mind", but rather reveals inner states like feelings, moods, or the whole of character or personality. Bühler's favourite correlate of expression is <u>Innerlichkeit</u>, the spiritual world within a person.

[2] By definition it would be possible to categorize the communication of one's perspective as the "expression" of what a person has in mind, i.e. with respect to an object or state of affairs. But this would be a significant redefinition of the term as established by Bühler (see note 1).

[3] Dependent linguistic variables indicative of the perspective taken by a speaker have been developed and validated in a series of experiments on perspective structure in language production and comprehension (cf. Graumann & Sommer, 1989).

[4] For the transcription and evaluation of the French-German dialogue I owe all of the data and some of the categories to the cooperative help of C.M. Sommer, E. Bröstler, B. Freitag, H. Jokisch, R. Höer, G. Klemp, and M. Kraus. The full report on this study will be published elsewhere.

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