

Perspectivity in Language
and Language Use

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Content

	page
1. The basic problem of perspectivity	2
2. Perspective in the study of language and cognition	5
2.1 Perspective in language	5
2.1.1 Perspective in the study of literature	7
2.1.2 Perspective in language use	10
2.2 Perspective in cognition	12
3. Perspective in language production and comprehension	13
4. Conclusion	18

Table 1 and Figures 1-3

References

Note

This paper is an interrelated presentation contributed to the Symposium on Language and Social Cognition (Organizers: Klaus Fiedler and Gün Semin), Rauischholzhausen, 2. - 6. Mai 1990.

1. The basic problem of perspectivity

The wording of the title of this paper may be taken as the expression either of a triviality or of a real problem. As psychologists we should not dichotomize between the trivial and the problematic: All too often we have been accused of doing research on trivia and of presenting results that, for others, have (allegedly) been part of the common stock of knowledge. But it is equally true that it is the so-called Selbstverständlichkeiten, the obvious, the self-evident things that we feel need closer scientific scrutiny. What I mean by either trivial or problematic is the opposition between (a) what has normally not been reflected upon and (b) what has been acknowledged and accepted as a research problem by the scientific community.

Looking at theory and research in the human sciences we discover that perspectivity is both: a negligible topic for many and an intriguing problem for some.

So what is the problem that it can easily be overlooked? Whoever acts - and for the psychologist speaking is acting - does so from a given position, from a point of departure, and, in Lewinian terms, it is locomotion toward a goal or point of destination, be it in physical, social or mental space (Lewin 1936). Nobody has ever challenged the basic fact that seeing something always means seeing it from a given viewpoint or, in a correlative term, in one of its aspects and being referred to other (potential or future) aspects of the same (object or person). Phenomenological analyses have shown (Husserl 1973; Graumann 1960) that in a structurally related sense this also holds for non-sensory cognitive experience. One and the same problem can be 'approached' from different 'sides' with different 'appearances' or 'aspects' corresponding to each approach. (Although philosophers may resent the spatial character of terms like 'approach' or 'side', 'position' or 'aspect', we cannot do psychology without the use of spatio-temporal metaphors.)

It is possible (and has traditionally been the elementary approach) to elaborate the full-fledged structure of perspectivity with its elements of viewpoint, aspect, and horizon on a strictly individualistic level. But since this has been done elsewhere (Graumann 1989; Graumann & Sommer 1988) and the present context is "Language and Social Cognition" I shall approach the topic of perspectivity on the social, or rather the interpersonal, level.

Going back to the title of this paper it should be self-evident that if there is a speaker then, usually, there is a hearer. Contrary to a certain linguistic (and psycholinguistic) tradition I shall not consider one individual who is a so-called speaker/hearer but (at least) two individuals communicating. In other words, my "point of departure" is social interaction, which not always but often enough is speaking and understanding speech in turns or simultaneously.

The study of social interaction has been on the research agenda of social psychology for about half a century but psychologists' "interaction" has remained kind of deaf-mute: Whatever the dyadic model, Ego and Alter, Person and Other, A and B, are said to interact, to communicate, but they don't speak. One of the 'pioneers' of social psychological communication studies is Th. Newcomb (1953/1962).

His ABX model (Fig. 1) is well known: A person A is (positively or negatively) 'attracted' by a person B with whom A maintains a "co-orientation" with respect to something, called X. For the present purpose, I do not want to discuss Newcomb's dynamic (ultimately homeostatic) hypotheses about such ABX relationships, but draw your attention to two complementary assumptions. The first one states that "the orientation of any A toward any B ... is rarely, if ever, made in an environmental vacuum" (1962, 150-151) - a warning against a purely interpersonal conception of social interaction which disregards the fact that

there is always something (an object, an event, a state of affairs or another person) with respect to which persons communicate. The complementary assumption states that "the orientation of any A capable of verbal communication about almost any conceivable X is rarely, if ever, made in a social vacuum. There are few if any objects so private that one's orientations toward them are uninfluenced by others' orientations" (1962, 151). Differing orientations of A and B toward X as well as A's "co-orientation" toward B and X imply both "cathetic and cognitive tendencies" (p. 150). They are perspectives from a given position A or B with respect to X, including the dynamically interesting case that A discovers B to hold a view of X different from A's viewpoint (which induces in A a "strain toward symmetry" with B).

Although Newcomb, commenting on his model, refers to "A and B as they communicate about X" (p. 151) and interprets the "strain toward symmetry" in terms of attempts "to influence another toward one's own point of view" (p. 153) or of A "trying to persuade B to his own point of view" (p. 155), the language of "influence" and "persuasion" does not enter this model of "communicative acts". It is semiotically empty. Newcomb's model is, however, only one of the many models of "communication without language" which Moscovici (1967) critically contrasted with those of "language without communication".

That A relates to B by talking about X is the basic rationale also of another model developed earlier by Karl Bühler (1933; 1934) in his theory of language, mainly in "The Axiomatization of the Language Sciences" (1982).

The so-called organum model (Fig. 2) rests upon Plato's dictum that language is an organum for one person's communicating with another about things. Again we have a triangular model with two persons and one object (or state of affairs) involved, but instead of three, it consists of four parts: Its center is the sign. By means of three functions

the sign binds A (the sender), B (the receiver) and X (here: objects and states of affairs) together: With respect to the sender the sign is "index" or "symptom"; with respect to the receiver it is "signal", with respect to the object it is "symbol". In the same vein, the sign is the sender's "expression", to the receiver it is "appeal", for the objects it is their "representation". No doubt that Bühler's is a sign-centered model of language, not a model of communication. Nothing happens between the persons nor between persons and object unless mediated by the central sign. That people are attracted by each other, that they are (cognitively) oriented toward objects without language, e.g. perceptually, is none of Bühler's concerns. Hence, we have a model of language without communication (cf. Heger 1971).

Contrasting these two models one may say that while Newcomb's is semiotically empty, but dynamically "hot", Bühler's is dynamically empty, but semiotically rich. What we need, however, for a social-psychological conception of verbal communication is at least a synthesis of both models (Fig. 3) indicating both the dynamics of mutual communication with respect to the environment and the expressive, appealing, and representative power of the language mediating such communication.

For the special topic of speaking and understanding from viewpoints the combined model illustrates not only that one and the same object X is experienced differently from different positions (to be found out by and giving rise to communicative acts). It also indicates that the way reference to an object is understood by a "receiver" depends on the signs used by the "sender". This is of special importance if the object talked about is not part of a common perceptual situation. Hence, we may hypothesize that the divergence of perspectives or orientations, which in Newcomb's model are cognitive and cathectic, but speechless, may also be found in a differential use of language by people talking from different positions or viewpoints.

2. Perspective in the study of language and cognition

Studies on perspective are widely scattered in psychology and in linguistics, as a rule without (explicit) reference to perspective theory. Neither for psychology nor for linguistics we can refer to a comprehensive critical review of the field. Limited selective overviews are given in Graumann (1989) and in Canisius (1987). For the present purpose of giving the background from which our own experiments were developed, it will do to exemplify where and in which respects perspective and viewpoint have been discovered and acknowledged as a topic of research. Since for a psychological audience studies of perspective in developmental and social psychology will be familiar - and I have elsewhere (Graumann 1989) tried to summarize them - I shall in the following accentuate seemingly remote linguistic and literary studies of perspective and viewpoint and only very selectively refer to such psychological investigations as have an immediate bearing on our studies. That is, I take the liberty of interpreting the general topic (of language and social cognition) in an interdisciplinary attitude trying to bring approaches to the problem of perspective from literary analysis, linguistics as well as from language and social psychology toward a convergence. The convergence and divergence of perspectives, however, is a central issue of the field we have just entered.

2.1. Perspective in language

Although historically and systematically linguistics may be a closer relative to social psychology than the study of literature, for the exemplification of perspective in language its treatment in literary analysis is a good point of departure. But for the student of social psychology the discussion of an initial question may be in place.

Why be interested in literature and literary theory? Is not literature mostly fiction while social psychology - as a science - has to deal with facts? If this is true it is only half the truth. There are several good reasons for an active interrelationship between social psychology and literature (e.g. Potter et al. 1984; Shotter & Gergen 1989). They need not be reiterated here. Two general arguments, however, may precede a more specific look into narratology.

First, we should not overemphasize the notorious distinction between fiction and fact for two reasons:

(a) A large part of the social information we receive and "process" in our everyday life is not immediate sensory experience, for which seeing may be believing. It is narrative and second-hand. We learn about others from different others, about "third persons" from "second persons", more precisely from the stories B tells A about X (in this case X being the third person). Since most of what we nowadays prefer to call "social cognition" refers actually to the information one individual gets about other individuals, we have - at least to a large extent - to do with the processing of texts, texts in whose veracity we may trust or not. Mainly texts of the story-type, as enjoyable or thrilling as they may be, very often keep us in suspense as to how much fact, how much fiction they carry. Even in social psychological experiments we have developed a penchant for fictitious target-persons, personality descriptions, cover stories, etc. Mainly in the special field of so-called person perception we rarely confront our subjects with real 'live' persons (occasionally actors), but with drawings, photographs, films and video-clips. Almost professionally and for methodological reasons we have made it a habit to cross the border between fact and fiction.

(b) The other reason against dichotomizing between fact and fiction comes straight from research on social cognition. If it is true that prejudice and stereotyping, schemata and heuristics, some say, normally, influence the veridicality

of social cognition and judgment, there must be a fictitious element in our everyday orientation and, above all, co-orientation.

The second argument comes from literary theory. Texts of a narrative or dramatical structure represent actions and dialogues that can properly be called social actions since usually we are presented with two or more actors whose activities are somehow interrelated, in love, jealousy, rivalry, strife, adventure. Very often we have a main character, the protagonist, around whom the whole plot is centered, and a counteracting antagonist. Hence, the rule in such stories and dramas is that one and the same situation is seen and dealt with differently by different actors, undoubtedly so in situations of interpersonal conflicts, the subject-matter of most dramas. If the story of a typical human conflict is well written or convincingly performed the topic of fact or fiction, of real or imaginary life does not come up, at least not for the listener, reader, spectator. What they see and hear is human experience.

Conversely, it happens occasionally in everyday life that we become first-hand witnesses of events that are so weird, phantastic, dreamlike or just incredible that we must put in an extra effort to pinch ourselves that this is real life.

Taking both arguments together I would suggest that social psychologists should neither exaggerate the necessary distinction between the factual and the fictitious, the real and the imaginary, nor stay away from literature as a source of psychological stimulation and (maybe) insight.

2.1.1. Perspective in the study of literature

If we, quite generally, accept that the use of language, among other things, has the communicative function of bringing a hearer (B) to attend to what a speaker (A) has

in mind (e.g. X), the question is how this is accomplished. (And if we replace the words "bringing B to attend" by "influencing" or "persuading" B, the social psychological interest in this topic should be evident.)

The author of a narrative text has different techniques available to establish perspective(s). The author may either introduce himself or herself as the narrator (in the first person singular) or, less immediate, let someone else be the narrator (in the first or third person) or let one of the main characters of the story present the essential position. Or, as Bakhtin (1973) has convincingly demonstrated for Dostoevsky, different world-views are brought forward by different 'voices' in a kind of verbal "polyphony". Finally, it can be the construction of the text as a whole that conveys the author's 'message' to the reader. But who is the reader? Fowler (1982, 214) criticizes Uspensky's theory of point of view (1973) for not being precise about the reader: Is (s)he a real person, an ideal, an average reader or merely implied in a text to be read? A pure linguist like Fowler himself prefers the "reader" to be "an abstract property of the compositional (i.e. linguistic) structure of the text", meaning that perspective can be linguistically pervasive without being allotted to individual personified voices. I emphasize this conception since we approached our on experimental analyses with the heuristic assumption that a still unknown number of linguistic features may be indicative of perspective. Psychologically relevant is Uspensky's early distinction of four different conceptions of point of view, namely,

- (a) as "an ideological and evaluative position",
- (b) as "a spatial and temporal position of the one who produces the description of the events",
- (c) "with respect to perceptual characteristics" or
- (d) "in a purely linguistic sense".

For the social psychologist the first and the third level of analysis are important:

- (a) Whether explicitly stated or merely implied, viewpoints are evaluative or value-expressive. If, as sociologists and

psychologists, following Mead and Piaget, maintain perspective-taking is a prerequisite for communication, we may expect that taking the perspective of another is not evaluatively neutral. In our own experiments as well as in related ones (e.g. Mummendey et al. 1984a, b) it was found that the protagonist with whom we had instructed our subjects to identify was valued more positively than the antagonist. (Fortunately, experimental subjects are not instructed to author dramas and novels, so that the many simplistic or rather dualistic, and frequently boring, black-and-white stories of the hero-and-villain type are not unnecessarily multiplied.)

(b) Since the conception of viewpoint as the spatial and temporal position of either author or reader, speaker or hearer is a special topic of the general linguistic study of deixis (see below), we may rather attend to Uspensky's conception and Fowler's elaboration of

(c) the "perceptual" sense of point of view. Since it is here that literary analysis comes closest to psychological research I should at least point to a few of the major distinctions, some of which may sound quite familiar to a psychologist.

There is mainly the distinction between the internal and external perspective. The author may either have or imagine access to the mental life of one of his or her characters (= internal perspective). Or, the author views (or lets view) a character from outside (external perspective). Here Uspensky, probably unknowingly, rephrases Dingler's distinction of "autopsychology" (first-person psychology) and "allopsychology" (third-person psychology) (cf. Holzkamp 1964, 70). For the internal perspective not only beauty but the whole world is "in the eyes of the beholder" who talks about his or her experience in the first person or voices his or her inner monologues (like Leopold Bloom's stream of consciousness in "Ulysses"). Or, a second possibility, "the narrator comments on or describes the mental processes ... of the characters" (Fowler 1982, 222) using what Uspensky called verba sentiendi, i.e. words denoting mental states

and processes. In both cases, the author acts like an empathizing psychologist.

Also for the external perspective two alternatives have been suggested (by Uspensky and Fowler). A character and his or her behavior may be described impersonally in a quasi-objective "behavioristic" account, in which even the narrator remains hidden. Or the narrator becomes a dominant figure as the story-teller who controls the plot, comments, interprets, passes judgment and evaluation, be it in sympathy with or in a critical attitude toward a character.

If the comprehension of narrative texts has to do with the reader's or listener's adoption of a point of view as some theorists say, we have here qualitatively and experientially quite different modalities of perspective-taking. Sometimes, in modern prose we go through them in rapid shifts of perspective. Sometimes, we are offered a synthesis of internal and external perspective as is the case in a 'literary experiment' done by Walter Jens (1961), in which a story is produced written from the perspective of an octogenarian who both remembers a past experience and reflects upon it with the wisdom of his old age. Being both actor and observer he unites "the immediacy of the personal perspective with the auctorial power of disposal" (Jens 1961, 86).

2.1.2. Perspective in language use

While in the analyses of literature the focus is on stylistic means how to convey viewpoints, the topic of perspective in linguistics is much more fundamental. A brief quotation from Joseph Grimes's "The Method of Discourse" (1975, 260) may illustrate the problem: "The more we look at it, the more evident it becomes that everything we say is phrased from a particular perspective, just as everything that a cinematographer shows on the screen is photographed from a particular perspective. He sets his camera

in a definite place and trains it principally on one character, in speech we choose one element that we are referring to as the point of departure for the relationships to all other elements. This affects word order, choice of pronouns, and decisions concerning subordination".

Linguistic means of ordering have pragmatically and psychologically also to be understood as means of orienting whom-ever speech is addressed to. As may be developed from Bühler's organum model, a speaker uses a sign to draw a hearer's attention to a nonlinguistic referent. Since, in principle, A has a choice of signs to identify X (for B), one and the same referent may be identified by different signs. In order to account for such differences Jim Wertsch (1985, 167-176) introduced the notion of referential perspective. It is "the perspective or viewpoint utilized by the speaker in order to identify a referent" (p. 168). Perhaps the most elementary semiotic means of referring someone to something are deictic expressions.

Without going into any details of this well-researched and broad linguistic and psycholinguistic problem area, I want to introduce a 'cognitive' qualification. Traditionally, the study of deixis has been restricted to personal, spatial, and temporal reference: I - you, here - there, now - then, come - go are the most common examples for the identification of positions, directions and movements. But while spatial deixis is usually considered with respect to (a common) visual space, temporal deixis already transcends the present perceptual field, and "figural" deixis in cognitive space, in which I may refer my interlocutor to different positions, different approaches and goals by means of deictic terms, may be just as unambiguous as orientation by pointing in the Zeigfeld (index field) (Bühler 1976), provided the referent is in my partner's "field of consciousness". The explanation may be found in the pervasive spatial and spatio-temporal metaphors without which psychological discourse would be very poor (and a paper on viewpoints impossible).

2.2. Perspective in cognition

The major interest of literary analysis and linguistics in viewpoints is with respect to texts and text-production. The fact that texts are usually produced to be read, that language has to be understood seems to concern psychologists rather than linguists. Hence, when psychologists deal with perspective it is mainly as a feature of language processing or, more generally, of information processing on the receptive rather than productive side.

Since it has been done elsewhere (Graumann 1989) I need not review the different fields of psychology in which perspective has been studied, such as the field of perspective-taking in cognitive and moral development, the study of perspective in interpersonal communication, whose "pioneer" is Ragnar Rommetveit (1974); the field of attitudinal judgment as covered by Upshaw's and Ostrom's "variable perspective approach" (cf. Upshaw & Ostrom 1984) plus Eiser's modifications (cf. Eiser 1986), the field of attribution as far as the so-called actor-observer divergence of perspectives is concerned (Jones & Nisbett 1972), the social psychology of aggression, where Mummendey and her associates (1984a, b) have demonstrated that actors and victims hold divergent perspectives of the same critical episode, or finally the topic of memory perspective.

I take the latter type of research to reemphasize the convergence and complementarity of literary and psychological studies. The fact underlying studies on point of view in personal memories (Nigro & Neisser 1983; Frank & Gilovich 1989) has been known for a long time: People remember biographical events from different visual perspectives. Either they have "observer memories", seeing themselves from the outside, or they have "field memories": They remember a scene as it was available to them in the original situation. Nigro and Neisser, who introduced this distinction,

show that subjects are more likely to adopt an observer perspective when asked to recall events they experienced further in the past whereas "recent events ... are more likely to appear as field memories" (p. 477). In addition, it could be demonstrated that "events involving a relatively high degree of emotional self-awareness are likely to produce observer memories" (p. 477). Since original experiences are normally in a "field perspective" later "observer memories" of the same experience must be considered to be reconstructions, some of which may be of the Freudian "screen memory" type (p. 468).

3. Perspective in language production and comprehension

In all these psychological studies the critical questions are: Which position does a person take with respect to an event or issue? How can the adoption of a position or viewpoint be accounted for in terms of the situation or of the person? With the exception of Rommetveit and of the Eiser group with their interest in the value connotation of judgmental labels (in response scales) the role of language in the adoption of viewpoints was largely ignored.

Even in the studies of the role of perspective in story comprehension and recall (Pichert & Anderson 1977; Anderson & Pichert 1978) there is no strictly linguistic description or definition of a perspective (nor any other theoretically satisfactory definition).

Convinced that it is possible to combine linguistic, psychological (and, I must add, phenomenological) knowledge about perspectivity (Graumann 1978; 1989), we theoretically derived and operationally established linguistic indicators of perspectivity to find out which of these means a speaker uses in order to convey a perspective a listener is invited to adopt.

Variables that we considered to be indicative of perspective are on two levels (Table 1): On the macro-level we worked with summaries (as manifestations of macro-structures) and with episode structures (written in macro-propositions); on the micro-level, depending on the specific task, the variables were grammatical subject, event-specific verbs, *verba sentiendi*, verbs of spatial orientation, later on words and phrases indicating violation of norms and accounting for it.

The method to induce a given perspective (our independent variable) was to present subjects with a video feature of a controversial social episode with always a protagonist and his opponent. Subjects were instructed to take the perspective of either character.

The major findings of the first four different experiments (1) on perspective and text production, (2) on perspective and memory, (3) on a comparison between text perspective and reader perspective and between speaker and hearer perspective were:

- (1) a confirmation of previous findings that a reader's perspective influences text comprehension;
- (2) that perspective also affects text production;
- (3) that these results can be reproduced after an interval of eight weeks;
- (4) that perspective affects not only the recall of idea units but specific semantic and syntactic variables;
- (5) that by means of such text variables a reader can be induced to take a given perspective.

In a fifth experiment with a different video feature we examined a hypothesis which had come up in the preceding studies, viz. that we should distinguish between situational and habitual perspectives. Situational perspectives are induced by somebody else or by some event in the present situation, as for instance, by experimental instruction or by persuasion to do something. Habitual perspec-

tives, on the other hand, are brought into the situation by the person who has acquired them in the course of his or her biography (or "learning history") or as part of the shared stock of social knowledge (as in social representations). The way we manipulated habitual perspective as our independent variable was by confronting two experimental groups of people (versus a control group) with a videotaped conflictuous social episode, the groups being (E1) professional drivers, such as cabbies, and (E2) habitual and committed (almost 'militant') cyclists. The situational perspective was, as usual, induced by the instruction to identify with the car-driving or bike-riding protagonist of a video film featuring a (professional) driver and a (convinced) cyclist on their different ways through town with encounters and mutual annoyances. Including a "neutral" instruction this yielded a 3x3 design (N=141) (Sommer & Graumann 1988).

The overall finding of this study is the dominance of the habitual over the situational perspective, less so on the macro-level than in micro-level variables such as grammatical subject, *verba sentiendi*, spatial and cognitive orientation and in the perspective-specific qualification of norm-violations, with the drivers "discounting" the driver's violations but augmenting those of the pedalling character. In all these variables the effects of the situational viewpoint was either insignificant or clearly weaker than those of the habitual perspective.

Finally, and in order to further validate our approach we did a linguistic (re)analysis of data raised by Amélie Mummendey and her group within their studies of aggressive interaction (Mummendey et al. 1984a, b). They had asked their subjects to watch a video feature of an argument and quarrel between two highschool students and to take the perspective of one of the pupils. The character to empathize with was either, in one episode, the "actor" or "initiator" of a verbal or physical attack against the other one, the "victim". Or he became, in a subsequent episode, the target

of the former victim now retaliating as the "reactor". Evaluations of the experimental perspective manipulations revealed that "subjects from the actor's perspective evaluate the actor's critical behavior as more appropriate and are less likely to label it as aggressive ..." (1984a, 94).

Leaning on these findings of an actor-victim divergence in aggressive interaction, we transcribed and analyzed Mum-mendey's tape-recorded verbal material in terms of the dependent measures that we considered to be indicators of perspective. While the full report on this "secondary" analysis is still in preparation, some preliminary results can be presented:

- (1) The hypothesis was confirmed that the protagonist whose perspective is taken more often becomes the grammatical subject than the antagonist.
- (2) Also confirmed was the hypothesis that words designating mental states and processes (*verba sentiendi* à la Us-pensky) are preferred for the person identified with.
- (3) Confirmed was also that verbal indications of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of emotional reactions are perspective-specific.
- (4) Also the discounting vs. augmenting of norm-violations proved to be a function of the perspective taken.
- (5) Partly confirmed was the hypothesis that initiators tend to account for their own actions in terms of external attribution while reactors prefer internal accounts of the initiator's action.

(No significant differences were found between the two perspectives in the variables spatial and cognitive orientation and norm-compliance, which may be due to type and brevity of texts.)

For further details and a discussion see the full report (Sommer et al., in prep.). The theoretical and methodological interest in this reanalysis is evidently that we have been able to accomplish two things: (1) to extend the vali-

dity of perspective theory to independently obtained data, and above all, (2) not only to corroborate, but to differentiate the findings about actor-victim divergences of perspective by means of analyzing free-speech verbal protocols.

We now feel encouraged to probe deeper into the territory of free speech and discourse, so far left to ethnographers of communication and discourse analysts. After a first pilot study on perspectival structure and dynamics in dialogues (Graumann, in press) we are presently trying to reconstruct the basic elements of perspectivity as defined by (our reading of) variable perspective theory, viz., own position, range, end-anchors and grain of a personal, i.e. subject-created "scale" of reference, in the field of persuasion, which we conceptualize as the effort to approximate a target person's perspective towards one's own (Sommer 1990).

4. Conclusion

To conclude and as an interim balance I would summarize the ideas and findings from literary, linguistic, and social-psychological studies of perspectivity in language and cognition in terms of a few postulates and hypotheses for further research:

(1) Irrespective of whether all knowledge is perspectival, as philosophical, sociological, and psychological perspectivists say (cf. Apel 1973; Mannheim 1936; McGuire 1984), we have sufficient reasons to assume that whenever we communicate whatever we have to say to someone about something, a position from which or with respect to which is either implied or explicitly addressed.

(2) Hence, as students of social interaction (or, for that matter, of social cognition) we should be prepared to discover signs of positions with respect to which an utterance or another social action makes sense.

(3) Perspective, although a basically cognitive term (of orientation and coorientation toward persons, objects, events and states of affairs), has its firm and objective place in language. Hence, the language we (have to) speak often enough predisposes the way we approach a subject.

(4) To the degree that language is not only the medium but also the boundary condition (potential as well as constraint) of a large part of social interaction, giving perspective to individual acts, a social psychology disregarding language (as condition, medium or product of interaction) keeps missing the chance of becoming a social science.

(5) Social interaction can only be fully understood if we succeed in discovering how, in spite of differing viewpoints, interlocutors attain mutuality of perspective. The frame in which this discovery is to be made is the dialogue rather than individual (speech-)acts.




Fig. 1. Newcomb's ABX model




Fig. 2. Bühler's organon model




Fig. 3. Bühler's organon model
Newcomb's ABX model

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